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The Paths of German Energy Transition: An Institutional Analysis
Heungkoo Lee* and Jae-Seung Lee**
The Germany energy transition has been enabled by continuous institutional evolution. The 
institutional development has continued while party coalitions have repeatedly changed. This study 
analyzes the institutional progress of the German energy transition under different political settings 
and extrinsic incidents. Institutional path generation of German energy transition was actualized by 
political and social responses to the global energy crises as well as the Chernobyl nuclear accident. 
The participation of the Green Party in the ruling coalition, with the introduction of EFA, played a 
significant role in launching the energy transition. The reinforcement of this institutional path was 
formed due to the replacement of the EFA with the EEG in 2000, under a strong political will for 
sustainable energy development. The Fukushima nuclear accident, and the continued support from 
the political coalition contributed to the institutional path maintenance for this energy transition. 
The progressive social and political environment changes in energy transition were prior conditions 
for setting up institutional strategies. External impacts were prime movers for the implementation 
of institutional methods or revisions. The institutional durability, in the face of critical alterations of 
internal and external circumstance, has provided a successful path to energy transition.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Germany has implemented Energiewende (hereafter referred to as ‘energy transition’) as 
the institutional system for sustainable energy development.1 This German energy transition 
was enabled through continuous institutional evolutions, along with political shifts, which 
lasted while party coalitions recurrently changed. This institutional progress is also reflected 
in several external shocks and incidents. For instance, the oil crises in 1970s raised the need 
for energy independence. The Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986 brought about a turning 
point in the active promotion of renewable energy development. EU’s policy for renewable 
energy promotion contributed to the strengthening of further renewable expansion. The 
Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011 provided a tangible reason to plan for nuclear phase-out 
by 2022.
This study begins with the question of how the institutional progress of the German 
energy transition evolved under different political settings and extrinsic incidents, and 
specifically how these internal and external factors influenced this institutional development. 
The following section reviews the previous literatures on German energy transition and 
* First author
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1 Germany has recorded constant economic growth, even with the reduction of primary energy 
consumption from 1989. The use of renewable energy showed a stable growth after the 1990s. For 
example, the portion of renewable energy in total electricity generation increased from 3.6% in 1990 
to over 30% in 2015 (Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, 2016).
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND AREA STUDIES 
Volume 26, Number 2, 2019, pp.99-118
100 HEUNGkOO LEE AND JAE-SEUNG LEE
provides a theoretical framework, based on historical institutionalism and path dependence. 
Subsequently, the institutional changes in German energy transition during the phases of path 
generation, reinforcement and maintenance are also analyzed. The last part concludes with 
the essential elements for effective institutional framework for energy transition.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW ON GERMAN ENERGY TRANSITION
Energy transition to enhance energy security and climate change responsiveness has 
been pursued in many countries. The German experience has been widely studied as one 
of representative cases to demonstrate the effective implementation of energy transition. 
Previous researches on German energy transition have been conducted in diverse disciplines 
such as institutional analysis, social and business development, energy technology and 
resources and international-domestic relations.
Fischer et al. (2016), knaut et al. (2016) and Han (2016) discussed the targets and 
expected outcomes of energy transition in Germany. Furthermore, regarding the policy 
framework of German energy transition, Pegels and Lütkenhorst (2014) provided a cost-
benefit analysis of the major objectives of German solar photovoltaic (PV) and wind energy 
policies such as competitiveness, innovation, job creation, emissions and cost reduction. 
Quitzow et al. (2016) explained the causes and effects of policy shifts in German energy 
transition, following the Fukushima nuclear accident. 
A series of studies examined the social and business aspects in German energy transition, 
which provided the basis of public acceptance of related policies. For instance, Sühlsen 
and Hisschemöller (2014) examined the lobbying strategies of German renewable energy 
companies during energy transition. Kungl (2015) compared the responses of major German 
energy companies to deal with internal and external changes, such as the liberalization of the 
power market and the Fukushima nuclear accident. Nordensvärd and Urban (2015) examined 
Germany’s feed-in tariff and other low carbon policies for achieving a socio-technical regime 
transition. Morton and Müller (2016) pointed out the importance of a social process in the 
energy policy framework. In addition, Guidolin and Guseo (2016) evaluated the social effects 
of transition from conventional nuclear energy to renewable ones. 
From a regional and comparative perspective, Gullberg et al. (2014) assessed the potential 
cooperation of renewable energy, especially focusing on the pumped-storage hydropower 
between Germany and Norway. Furthermore, Mulder and Scholtens (2016) examined the 
effects of Germany’s energy transition in the electricity market of Netherlands, while Lutz 
et al. (2017) analyzed the implementation factors of renewable energies in 18 sub-regions 
in Germany. Regarding technology and resource development, in German energy transition, 
Viebahn et al. (2015) evaluated the significance of the crucial minerals related to renewable 
energies, and Schmid et al. (2016) analyzed the decarbonization of the German electricity 
system from technical viewpoints. 
In most of these literatures, the elements and consequences of the German energy 
transition have been widely mentioned. However, the evolutionary process of energy 
transition needs further elaboration from the institutional perspectives, which constituted the 
foundation of successive policy measures. This study provides a more focused analysis of 
this institutional evolution, based on the path dependence model.
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3. HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND PATH DEPENDENCE
New institutionalism considers institutions as independent variables, at an equal to or 
higher status than individuals, to help explain social phenomenon (Amenta and kelly, 2010). 
It can largely be divided into rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism 
and historical institutionalism. Rational choice institutionalism highlights the individuals’ 
preferences and interests to maximize utility within the boundaries of institution (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996). In sociological institutionalism, the institutional shift explains the process 
of structure building of the organization and the pursuit of the individual’s rationality 
(Schmidt, 2009). Historical institutionalism assumes that institution is a historical product 
and concentrates on the historical process in a macroscopic context. It emphasizes historical 
causation and path dependence as well as the timing and sequence of events (Thelen, 
1999). Path dependence can explain the creation of institutions and its changes, and how an 
institution can continuously be implemented in the current time from the past. It is defined 
as the tendency through which institutional selection within a certain period of the past, 
continuously restricts institutional selection in the present and future—an institution of the 
past could impose a constraint on the creation of future institutions (Hall and Taylor, 1996). 
Furthermore, historical institutionalism argues that a past institution affects institutional 
formations in the present and future.
While applying the path dependence theory to the analysis of the energy policy, Hake et 
al. (2015) explained the political developments in the German energy transition. Eikeland 
and Inderberg (2016) analyzed changes in the energy system and policies in Demark, using 
public choice and path dependency perspectives. Moncada et al. (2017) explained the 
development of German biofuel production using the path dependence theory, and analyzed 
the effects of institutional shifts on a biodiesel value chain in the Germany. Lee and Gloaguen 
(2015) investigated the perception of nuclear energy development in France, in terms of 
path dependence and lock-in effects. Nilsen (2017) investigated Statoil’s environmental 
decisions using path dependence and structural inertia. All these studies showed the utility 
of path dependence in explaining the long-term development of energy policies, reflecting 
institutional continuity or regime shift as well as external impacts.
The form of path dependence is classified through self-reinforcing and reactive sequences. 
Self-reinforcing sequences refer to a situation in which the path selected using critical 
junctures is maintained by its continuous reproducing, until another accidental impact (David, 
1985). Reactive sequences refer to the formation of a path in which multiple events connect 
Figure 1. Analysis model of German Energiewende
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under necessary and sufficient conditions. Mahoney (2000) and Martin as well as Simmie 
(2008) presented subsequent stages of path dependence.
This study analyzes how continuous institutional evolution of German energy transition 
has occurred from the path dependence perspective. This institutional analysis focuses on 
Electricity Feed-in Act (EFA) and the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG), which have 
been implemented as the backbone of the institutional system, to promote effective energy 
transition. An analytical framework of this research is presented in Figure 1.
4. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN GERMAN RENEWABLE ENERGY
4.1 EFA: The beginning of institutional progress in German renewable energy
The EFA began with Eurosolar’s and Förderverein Solarenergie’s proposal in 1989, which 
focused on a guarantee of minimum feed-in payments and was largely advocated by wind 
power industries in Northwestern states and by operators of small-scale hydropower plants 
in Southeast and Southwest Germany (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004). The German Research 
Ministry implemented a test program for 100 MW, large-scale wind power in the late 1980s, 
which was followed by 250 MW large-scale wind power in 1991 (klaassen et al., 2005). The 
EFA was passed unanimously in the national parliament on December 1990, and it came into 
effect on 1 January 1991.2
The core idea of the EFA was to regulate the purchase and the price of electricity from 
certain types of renewable energy sources in Germany such as wind, landfill gas, biomass, 
hydropower, solar and sewage gas. The EFA assured a renewable energy feed-in tariff and a 
connection to the power grid. For example, 80% of the retail price in electricity, generated 
by specific types of renewable energy sources was paid by grid operators as a feed-in tariff. 
However, a capacity above 5MW of electricity produced by biomass, biogas and hydro 
were excluded from the EFA. Moreover, it could not cover a share of over 25% electricity 
generated by a public electricity utility, a Federal state or the Federal Republic of Germany 
(Gipe, 2015).
The first revision of the EFA was made in 1994, and it concentrated on a modification on 
the proportion of compensation. The most notable changes in the second revision in 1998 
was the 5% cap, or a so-called hardship clause, on the purchase responsibility of grid firms 
(Bechberger, 2000). The hardship clause in the EFA in 1991 noted that electricity utilities had 
the authority to be exempted from the purchase responsibility when immoderate technical, 
economic or legal burdens were unduly imposed on them. 
4.2 The institutional driving force of energy transition (EEG in 2000, 2004 & 2009) 
The expansion of institutional support for German renewable energy begun with the 
replacement of the EFA with the EEG. The unbalanced development of renewable energy 
under the EFA was supported by the amendment of tariffs under the EEG in 2000. The 
2 In fact, enactment of the EFA was not so controversial issues in German electricity sector (Suck, 
2008). German electricity market for supply and distribution was monopolized by a small numbers of 
major companies such as REW (Rheinland Westfalen Energie), EnBw (Energie Baden Württember), 
E.ON, and Vattenfall Europe.
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majority of wind power operators in North Germany had already achieved a twofold 5% cap 
in the late 1990s, and therefore, the obligation to buy electricity produced by wind power 
was not applicable (Mendonça, 2007). In the late 1990s, most of remuneration proportions 
were increased in the EEG to enhance price competitiveness of renewable energies in the 
liberalized electricity market. The criteria for tariffs of the EEG was established based on 
the production costs of renewable energy sources. The electricity produced by methane gas 
from abandoned mines and geothermal resources were also covered under the EEG. The 
purchase guarantee and the feed-in tariffs for 20 years, from the beginning of the operations 
of all newly qualified power plants of renewable energy were fixed in the EEG, except for 
hydropower.
The EEG in 2004 and 2009, pursued a balanced but constant renewable energy growth. 
The EEG in 2004 set up a new goal for the share of renewable energies, with total electricity 
generation at least 12.5% by 2010 and 20% by 2020 (IEA, 2016a). A new hardship clause 
was also introduced in the 2004 EEG, which loosened the obligation to buy electricity 
generated by renewable energy sources for price competitiveness of energy-intensive firms, 
in order to protect them in the international market. The 2004 EEG brought in the change 
of feed-in tariffs for different types of renewable energy sources and aimed to stimulate the 
development of technologies, preventing the moral hazard of depending on the subsidies of 
feed-in tariffs. In the 2009 EEG, the target amount of electricity to be produced by renewable 
energy sources increased from 20% to 30%, in total electricity production by 2020. The 
period for feed-in tariffs was extended to a minimum of 20 years but the standard for 
minimum prices would be applied differently. The change of remuneration in the 2009 EEG 
was focused on the wind and solar power sectors (see Table 1).
4.3 From state-led to market-oriented energy transition (EEG in 2012 & 2014) 
The extent of decrease in tariffs and the introduction of market-friendly regulations, 
demonstrated the change of institutional direction towards supporting renewable energy in the 
German energy transition. The decrease in tariffs (see Table 1), market integration model and 
the grid connection system were adopted in the EEG of 2012.3 Even with market-led support 
policies, ambitious but practical goals for renewable energy growth was maintained. The 
renewable energy growth in the EEG of 2012 aimed to reach 35% in total energy production 
by 2020. The category of renewable energy sources was further expanded in the 2012 EEG to 
include biogas, landfill gas, sewage treatment gas, bio-methane and biodegradable municipal 
and industrial waste.
In EEG 2014, the share of renewable energy in total electricity consumption was targeted 
to reach 40–50% in 2025, 55–60% in 2035 and 80% in 2050 (IEA, 2016d). The growth 
corridors or floating caps for newly installed renewable energy were annually set at 2.5GW 
for onshore wind and solar PV energy, 6.5–7.7GW for offshore wind until 2020 and 100MW 
in terms of biomass (IEA, 2016d). A contract for difference (CFD) replaced the feed-in 
payment. As the financial burden of the suppliers could be increased through obligatory 
3 Market integration model was an optional system to deliver electricity generation through renewable 
energy sources, from suppliers to consumers, without stages of distribution (Jankowska, 2014). The 
grid connection system enabled producers of electricity generated by renewable energy sources, to 
allow the use of preferential grid connections with payment of surcharge (Schomerus, 2012).
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direct marketing, a market premium was also introduced for the producers.4 The fixed legal 
tariff was changed, and about 40% of the EEG surcharge was newly applied.
4 This premium is computed using the difference between the average monthly wholesale price in 
electricity exchange and the compensation for the production of electricity using renewable energies, 
a mentioned in the legislation.
Table 1. A comparable change in tariffs under EEG 2009 and 2012
EEG 2009 EEG 2012
Onshore 
wind
•  First 5 years operation: From EUR 8.03 ct/
kWh to EUR 9.2 ct/kWh 
•  After 5 years operation: EUR 5.02 ct/kWh
•  Degression of new installation: From 2% to 
1%
•  Initial tariff: EUR 8.93 ct/kWh




•  Initial tariff: EUR 15 ct/kWh until 2015
•  Since 2015, new installation EUR 13 ct/
kWh and annually 5% degression
•  Initial tariff: 15 cent/kWh
•  No degression for new installation until 
2018
•  Since 2018, annually 7% degression
•  Conditional feed in tariff: From EUR 15 ct/




Below 30kW: EUR 43.01 ct/kWh
Below 30 kWh: 28. 74 ct/kWh Since 2013, 
annually 9% 
degression
30~100kW: EUR 40.91 ct/kWh
100kW~1MW: EUR 39.58 ct kWh
Over 1MW: EUR 33 ct/kWh
Free 
standing EUR 31.94 ct/kWh EUR 22.07 ct/kWh
Source: Created by authors based on IEA, 2016b and IEA, 2016c.
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5. INSTITUTIONAL PATHS OF GERMAN ENERGY TRANSITION 
5.1 Path generation: Global energy crises and Die Grünen
The institutional path generation in German energy transition was pushed due to an 
increase in civil awareness of the dangers of atomic energy and environmental damages. The 
idea of German energy transition was developed from the anti-nuclear energy campaign, 
led by the New Social Movements in 1973. Technical issues from nuclear power plants, 
such as atomic power waste and warming of river temperatures, raised attention about the 
risks of nuclear power in German civil society. Experts and academic scholars also began 
becoming involved in the anti-nuclear energy movement. The Institute for Applied Ecology 
(Oko-institut) was established as a green think tank in 1977. The term Energiewende was 
introduced for the first time in 1980, in the book Energy transition: Growth and prosperity 
without oil and uranium (Jacobs, 2012). Moreover, fossil-fuels-based power plants could 
not be free from this energy transition. The destruction of Germany’s southern forests due 
to acid rain in the early and mid-1980s, brought about a stronger voice for environmental 
movement and the use of safe and environmentally friendly energy sources in power plants 
and industrial sectors.
However, institutional path generation for renewable energy deployment did not fully 
emerge due to existing political support for nuclear power. The Federal Republic of German 
government promoted nuclear development for continuous economic growth at the expense 
of the environment. Additionally, the Federal Ministry for Nuclear Affairs was established 
in 1955, and the first national nuclear program was launched with the German Atomic 
Commission in 1956. Furthermore, the loss of competitiveness in the German coal industry 
through price reductions of imported coal in the 1960s allowed nuclear power to maintain 
its status as a dependable energy supply source. The coalition between the CDU (Christlich 
Demokratische Union Deutschlands), CSU (Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern) and the SPD 
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) (1966–1969) pursued a policy of nuclear power 
expansion, despite the recognition of risk from the nuclear development.5 The coalition 
between the SPD and FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei) (1969–1982) made environmental 
regulations along with the establishment of an advisory council for the environment in 
1971 and the Federal Environment Agency in 1974. However, these environmental policies 
focused on pollutant management and still enabled continuous nuclear development. 
The global energy crises in the 1970s, provided momentum for the institutional path 
generation of German energy transition. The sharp reduction of oil supply by the enforcement 
embargo of the organization of petroleum exporting countries (OPEC), led to the first oil 
crisis in 1973.6 The second oil shock in 1979 was ignited by the Iranian Revolution, from 
1978 to 1979. These two crises brought about a decline in oil production in countries around 
the Persian Gulf, and the unprecedented price hike of OPEC crude oil. The oil crises of 1973 
and 1979 were turning points in the path to energy transition, and the first external impacts 
5 The coalition CDU, CSU, and SPD invested around DM 6.2 billion for the 3rd national nuclear 
program between 1967 and 1972 (Illing, 2012). It was larger than the total investment for the 1st and 
2nd national nuclear programs. 
6 Due to the first oil shock, Germany’s GDP growth between 1973 and 1975 declined, from 11.4% to 
3.8%. However, it rebounded by 8.4% in 1976, as a result of the swift response to the high price of 
oil (Cooper and Yue, 2008).
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to mark the clear beginning of the institutional path generation. Furthermore, technological 
innovations to develop renewable energy and energy efficiency were accelerated under the 
framework of energy security.
Even with global oil crisis, the utilization of nuclear energy was still a controversial 
subject in German society and politics. The anti-nuclear movement began to expand from 
protests over nuclear power plant constructions at Breisbach in 1971 and Wyhl between 1973 
and 1975 (Roose, 2010). Three Mile Island accident and the construction plan of a nuclear 
waste facility at Gorleben in 1979, led to anti-nuclear campaigns throughout the country. 
The German national parliament formed the Enquete Commission, “Future Nuclear Energy 
Policy” in 1980 (Bundestag, 1980). The Commission concluded that nuclear power would 
not be necessary under the conditions of energy demand reduction and alternative energy 
development.7 However, two main political parties—the SPD and CDU—maintained a 
positive attitude regarding the utilization of nuclear power to improve the national energy 
security (Gast, 2011). 
The Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986, added another extrinsic impact to strengthen the 
institutional path generation for renewable energy deployment (Bruns et al., 2009). It changed 
the perception on nuclear energy and triggered political and social measures for energy 
transition. The establishment of the Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation, 
and Nuclear Safety was a representative example of the direct reaction to the Chernobyl 
accident in Germany. The German Institute for Economic Research reported the feasibility 
of stable electricity supply and demand without nuclear power (Ziesing, 1986). Chernobyl’s 
incident helped raise awareness about the perils of nuclear power as an unreliable energy 
source, and generated the institutional system of energy transition in Germany.
The participation of Die Grünen (the Greens) as a coalition partner of the SPD was a 
turning point in the institutional path generation for energy transition. As a representative 
political party claiming the importance of environmental protection, the Greens entered the 
national parliament for the first time in 1983.8 The political direction of the SPD on the use 
of nuclear energy began to change following Chernobyl and provided a political motivation 
to create a coalition with the Greens. These political changes influenced the enforcement of 
the EFA in 1991, and its subsequent implementation (Stefes, 2016). An institutional shift in 
energy transition began, following the participation of the Greens in national parliament and 
the coalition between the Greens and SPD.
The EFA was the first institutional action for the comprehensive development of 
electricity generation from renewable energies (Bruns et al., 2009). A number of German 
government officials and municipalities, major political parties and advocacy groups, such as 
Eurosolar or the Inland Wind Power Association, publicly endorsed the EFA.9 The increased 
recognition of energy security and endorsement from key political players, were important 
factors in decision-making surrounding the EFA. A majority member of the national 
7 The low level of energy prices in West Germany, accelerated the unnecessariness of nuclear power 
expansion (Mez, 2009). Furthermore, coal power had also brought about forest destruction through 
acid rain, in the early and mid-1980s, which strengthened the voice for renewable energy expansion.
8 The Greens had 5.6% of the national vote and 27 seats (Bomberg, 1998).
9 The Minister of Environment, Dr. klaus Töpfer, Dr. Wolfgang Daniels from the Greens and Dr. 
Hermann Scheer from the SPD, representatively supported the EFA (Bruns, Ohlhorst and Wenzel, 
2010). Amongst members of the CDU and the CSU, Matthias Engelsberger and Bernd Schmidbauer 
endorsed the EFA in 1991 (Brand, 2004).
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parliament and government officials representing the Chancellor consented to the revision of 
the EFA 1994. Angela Merkel, who served as the minister of environment between 1994 and 
1998, and Walter Hirche, who was the parliamentary state secretary belonging to the FDP, 
strongly supported the improvement of the EFA through modifications. 
Meanwhile, even though the Federal Ministry of Economics expressed strong opposition 
to the revision of the EFA, the overwhelming political and public support could not be 
neglected (Bruns et al., 2011). Additionally, the electricity industry started to make opposing 
claims about this revision, with one of the organizations that had denounced the EFA—
The Association of German Electricity Power Utilities (VDEW; Verband der deutschen 
Elektrizitätswirtschaft)—raised a counterargument to the consideration of illegality about 
the EFA, focusing on the principle of a free market and the German constitution (Zitzer, 
2009) in the Federal Constitutional Court; the court adjudicated that the EFA is not against 
the constitution (Wong, 2010). In retaliation, the legally binding compensation rates for 
electricity generated by renewable energies was cut by a number of utility companies, based 
on the argument of the VDEW. This reduction resulted in an enormous amount of criticism 
from the public. Most members of the national parliament and all the political parties showed 
their displeasure with the VDEW.
The second revision of the EFA was passed in 1998 without noticeable political 
controversy in the parliament. A coalition between the Greens and SPD obtained the majority 
in the parliament from 1998 to 2005. However, a number of private sectors still harbored 
doubts about lawfulness of this amendment and raised legal questions about this revision 
(Armenteros and Lefevere, 2001). The legitimacy of this amendment was eventually 
reviewed by the European Court of Justice, and the decision stated that the second revision of 
the EFA was unchallengeable in terms of EU law.
In sum, the EFA was the first institutional foundation to create a noticeable change 
in the German electricity market, in terms of provisions of a wide range of opportunities 
for renewable energy firms with competitiveness. The EFA was replaced by the more 
comprehensive EEG, which reflected a strong momentum for continuous institutional support 
for energy transition. This was the beginning of institutional durability in German energy 
transition (Bruns et al., 2009; Becker, Beveridge, and Rohring, 2016; Stefes, 2016).
5.2  Path reinforcement: Political will for Energiewende and EU’s institutional 
guidance
The institutional path reinforcement in German energy transition began with the 
enactment of the EEG in 2000, under the coalition between the Greens and the SPD. 
It reflected the change of institutional will to improve German energy transition, with 
an increased target on renewable energy and the expansion of remuneration for various 
renewable energy sources. A strong political will of the Greens and SPD about energy 
transition was proved by not only the EEG but by the establishment of additional energy 
policies and legislations in 1999, such as the Ecological Tax Reform, the 100,000 solar roofs 
program (HTDP) and the market incentive program. Furthermore, a new plan was presented 
for phasing out 17 domestic nuclear power plants by 2020, without compensation. This 
resulted in the enactment of the act for the Orderly Termination of the Use of Nuclear Energy 
for the Commercial Generation of Electricity in 2002. These institutional actions brought 
about direct opposition from the CDU, CSU and FDP.
However, a policy instrumental for renewable energy development in the EU, provided 
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for additional enhancements of the EEG. A guideline from the EU for renewable energy 
sources in 2001 was a key factor in the EEG revision in 2004. According to the guideline, 
the EU asks the member countries to implement an overall review of the production, supply 
and distribution of renewable energy sources (Fräss-Ehrfeld, 2009). The coalition attempted 
to amend the EEG, based on the decision regarding the necessity of specific and concrete 
definitions for renewable energies, in order to create continuous outcomes for the supply 
expansion of renewable energy (Dagger, 2009). The amended EEG in 2004 stipulated that the 
Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi) was required to submit a progress 
report about the renewable energy market and its cost development. EU’s Renewable Energy 
Roadmap in 2007 suggested 20% of renewable energy within the total share of energy in the 
EU by 2020 (Commission of the European Communities, 2007). This target was reflected 
in the further modifications of the EEG in 2009. Thus, EU’s renewable energy promotion 
policies were an external driving force in the evolution of institutional path reinforcement in 
German energy transition.
Under the grand coalition between the CDU, CSU and the SPD, from 2005 to 2009, the 
institutional path in energy transition continued, until a major modification in the EEG in 
2009. The newly formed grand coalition did not make any notable modifications to the EEG, 
and the SPD continued its political alliance with the Greens, and formed the grand coalition. 
However, the CDU and CSU shifted away from critical attitude on the EEG and proposed 
improvements to the efficiency of its implementation. This led them to win 226 seats, while 
the SPD won 222 in the 2005 election (Statistische Bundesamt, 2005). The CDU and CSU 
began to uphold a supportive view on the renewable energy expansion, while maintaining a 
favorable stance on nuclear power. This coalition emphasized renewable energy expansion 
for environmental enhancement as well as its economic role in the energy policy. The goal of 
renewable energy growth and the fundamental structure of the EEG in 2009 were upheld by 
this coalition. 
In conclusion, the institutional path of energy transition was reinforced through active 
support for the EEG by the coalition between the Greens and SPD and the grand coalition. 
EU’s institutional guidance to promoting renewable energy expansion also enhanced 
institutional strategies for energy transition in the Germany. These internal and external 
impacts led to the unceasing evolution of the EEG, until the formation of a second grand 
coalition and the Fukushima nuclear accident (Jungjohann, 2016; Stefes, 2016).
5.3 Path maintenance: Fukushima nuclear accident and political reformation
The institutional path was maintained with the formation of the second grand coalition 
between the CDU, CSU and the FDP in 2009. All the major political parties, including the 
FDP, started to assent to the continuous renewable energy expansion through the EEG. The 
FDP’s political shift regarding EEG was made possible through lobbying efforts by renewable 
industries, such as the Agency for Renewable Energies and the German Solar Industry 
Association (Gründinger, 2017). The political support for renewable energy from this second 
grand coalition could be seen in the energy concept plan (Energiekonzept) of 2010 (BMWi, 
2010). This was proposed as a long-term plan for energy supply and as a response to climate 
change up to 2050. The renewable energies, particularly wind power, occupy the largest 
portion of energy mix in the future. It was suggested that renewable energies should provide 
18% of the gross final energy consumption, and 35% of the gross electricity consumption by 
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2020.10 
However, the second grand coalition still maintained a favorable attitude towards 
nuclear power, which was referred to in the Energy Concept of 2010—inexpensive and a 
bridge to renewable energy (BMWi, 2010). Their institutional strategy for energy transition 
concentrated on the greenhouse gas emission reduction using nuclear power as well as 
renewable energies. An agreement of this coalition presented that nuclear power was a 
necessity to be regarded as a transitional technology, until the stabilization of power demand 
by renewable energies. This coalition decided to extend the lifetime of the existing nuclear 
plants—8 to 14 years after 2021—in direct contrast to the major aims of the previous 
institutional strategies. This lifetime extension was based on the modification of the Atomic 
Energy Act in 2010 (Bundestag, 2010), and it reflected the concept of energy policy being 
followed by this coalition. Moreover, it was noted that wind power and solar cells would 
usher in side effects, such as bird shredding and increased subsidies (Deutscher Bundestag 
Stenografischer Bericht, 2010). However, further plans for investment, development and 
construction of nuclear power plants was not embarked upon in the grand coalition. This 
coalition also adopted the Nuclear Fuel Taxation Act and the Energy and Climate Fund along 
with the expansion of nuclear lifetimes as part of agreement in 2010 (Gründinger, 2017). 
In 2011, the strategy of the second grand coalition altered following the Fukushima 
nuclear accident, which was a crucial external factor in maintaining institutional advancement 
of energy transition. Angela Merkel’s government announced the immediate shutting down 
of eight obsolete nuclear power plants on June 11, 2011 and a phase-out of nine nuclear 
power plants by 2022. The plan for a phase-out of the nuclear power plants was enacted, and 
Federal Council of Germany (Bundesrat) also approved the legislative plans for phase-out by 
July 8, 2011. There was an overwhelming agreement in the parliament votes regarding the 
phase-out—513 out of 622 from both major political parties (Spiegel Online International, 
2011).11 The public endorsement on the nuclear phase-out exploded after the Fukushima 
accident. The social acceptance on the nuclear phase-out contributed to the strengthening 
institutional path maintenance for energy transition. 
An enhanced institutional path of energy transition, following the impact of the 
Fukushima accident, was directly presented in the amendment of EEG in 2012. For the first 
time since the EEG of 2000, another institutional evolution of German energy transition 
began with the EEG in 2012. It outlined ambitious but practical targets for renewable energy 
expansion, with the consideration of EU guidance.12 The EEG of 2012 proposed a market-
oriented development of renewable energy, through the introduction of a market integration 
model and the grid connection system. This institutional progress for continuous German 
energy transition was spurred by the social requirement for nuclear power reduction and 
renewable energy expansion. Germany has been aware of the huge risk of nuclear power 
through the experience of Chernobyl, and the Fukushima case evoked the danger further, 
which led to a phase-out of nuclear power plants again. The private sectors also showed 
10 Targets of renewable energy production in the share of gross final energy consumption and gross 
electricity consumption would be increased as follows: 30% and 50% by 2030, 45% and 65% by 
2040, and 60% and 80% by 2050 (BMWi, 2010). 
11 More than 70% of CDU and CSU supporters showed a positive opinion on the political decision of 
nuclear phase-out (Allensbach, 2011).
12 The European directive 2009/28/EC suggests 20% of renewable energy be present in the entire 
energy generation model (European Commission, 2012).
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support for the institutional continuity for energy transition. Representatively, Siemens, 
which was responsible for all 17 existing nuclear power reactors in Germany, stated that 
there would be no plans for the construction of new nuclear power plants in the aftermath of 
the Fukushima accident (Borrud, 2011). Even with a gradual increase of electricity prices, 
the public opinion about future energy source in Germany has turned towards renewables; 
particularly, the younger generation is more positive about the transition to renewables 
(Amelang, 2015). 
The SPD joined in the third grand coalition in 2013. The new political structure involved 
a coalition among the SPD, CDU and CSU, and provided renewed fervor to the institutional 
path for the maintenance of energy transition. The third grand coalition showed a positive 
stance towards the nuclear phase-out and renewable energy development, based on economic 
feasibility (Hirschhausen and Reitz, 2014). The new coalition government agreed that 
last nuclear power plant in Germany would at least be shut down by 2022, and the energy 
transition would be continuously implemented. The administrative task for renewable energy 
policy was transferred from the Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation 
and Nuclear Safety (BMU) to the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy, which 
signified the political stance on constant energy transition with the consideration of economic 
practicality. The modified EEG of 2014 showed an institutional will for renewable energy 
growth, while retaining a market-driven development of renewable energy. An introduction 
of growth corridors, expansion of direct marketing systems and the abolition of Green 
electricity privilege mirrored a new direction for the 2014 EEG. An implementation of a pilot 
tender for free standing solar PV systems in the EEG of 2014, clearly indicated institutional 
evolution for market-led energy transitions.
A positive attitude of all major parties towards the EEG brought about a turning point 
in keeping institutional durability for renewable energy development. The Fukushima 
nuclear accident was the foremost extrinsic factor in maintaining the institutional path for 
energy transition. It influenced the aggressive changes in the revised EEG of 2012 and the 
participation of the SPD in the third grand coalition. The amended EEG of 2014 presented a 
more solid strategy for market-oriented development of renewable energy and nuclear phase-
out.
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6. CONCLUSION
This study analyzed the continuous institutional evolution of German energy transition, 
based on three distinct stages of the perspective of path dependence. Figure 2 summarizes the 
institutional changes of German renewable energy, from the EFA to EEG. The institutional 
progress of German energy transition began with the EFA in 1991, which became the 
institutional foundation for feed-in-tariff based renewable energy expansion. The replacement 
of the EFA with the EEG in 2000, and further revisions in 2004 and 2009, were institutional 
momentums for renewable energy growth, with an enlarged and strengthened FIT. Moreover, 
another institutional evolution for German energy transition was reflected in the EEG 
modifications of 2012 and 2014. The institutional direction for renewable energy expansion 
moved from state-led to market-oriented, involving direct marketing systems and pilot 
tenders for solar PV.
Figure 3 summarizes the institutional path dependence of German energy transition. An 
analysis of each phase demonstrates significant changes in the institutional system for energy 
transition. The institutional path generation was initiated due to the political and social 
responses to the global energy crises as well as the Chernobyl nuclear accident. Moreover, 
the participation of the Green Party in the ruling coalition played a significant role in 
launching energy transition. Even with major political parties’ espousal of nuclear power for 
constant economic growth and greenhouse gas emission, the launch of institutional progress 
in energy transition was enabled by the public consensus and political changes. With the 
establishment of effective institutional strategies for energy transition, the EFA accompanied 
the progressive shift in social and political circumstances.
The reinforcement of this path was further formed by the replacement of the EFA with 
the EEG in 2000, under strong political will for sustainable energy development. A profound 
interest of political affiliations in reducing nuclear power and the expansion of renewable 
energy facilitated the improvement of an institutional system. Furthermore, the EU’s 
institutional guidance involving the electricity market and renewable energy expansion also 
contributed to the change of the institutional path and its enhancements. Even with notable 
changes of political circumstance, the political momentum for energy transition was robust 
and consistent. It conclusively led to the amendment of the EEG in 2009 and 2012 for 
constant renewable energy growth. 
The Fukushima nuclear accident and the continued support from the political coalitions 
contributed to the maintenance of the institutional path towards German energy transition. 
Although the newly formed coalition in 2009 still had a favorable stance towards nuclear 
power, it did not lead to considerable institutional alteration in the energy transition. All the 
major political parties held positive attitudes surrounding the renewable development of 
the EEG, demonstrating the importance of institutional durability. The Fukushima accident 
brought about a renewed social consensus and a change in the collective consciousness of the 
coalition, which enabled an institutional evolution from state-led to market-driven strategies 
for the EEG in 2012 and 2014. Hence, institutional durability, which led to a flexible 
response to these external and internal changes, was a significant factor in enabling constant 
energy transition.
This institutional analysis of German energy transition provides crucial implications for 
other countries that implement strategies for energy transition. The progressive changes in 
the social and political environment regarding energy transition, were prior conditions for 
setting up institutional strategies. External impacts were the prime movers for institutional 
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implementations and/or revisions. Additionally, a strong political will added momentum to 
the reinforcement of the institutional system. Basically, institutional durability in the face of 
critical changes of internal and external circumstances, helped pave the successful path to 
energy transition.
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